But in this description we have also a double contemplation, the component parts whereof are just as distinct as they were found to be in the former case: firstly, a contemplation of the condition, and, secondly-, a contemplation of the faculty.
a. The contemplation of the condition may be expressed as a knowledge of knowledge; a knowledge of a confinedness or limitation of the internal sense through the perception of a determined external object, precisely as the external sense was in external perception limited by the object itself.
b. The contemplation of the faculty may be expressed as a knowledge of a principle, beyond all causality. This contemplation or knowledge is (just as we found extension to be in external perception) a contemplation of the faculty of knowledge. But there is this distinction, that whereas in external perception the infinite faculty realized itself actually' and had causality, that is, an actualinfinity, which was pressed together to a totality only through the form of contemplation, here the principle generally, without any act or causality, is contemplated in its merely possibleinfinity.
Let me ask now: is this consciousness of a principle actually a contemplation? If we look at its formwe cannot but answer yes, since it is the immediate expression of freedom which lifts itself above causality by its mere being; but if we look at the substance, we might fall into doubt. For a principle is an activity that extends beyond each of its possible causalities. Here, therefore, appears a going beyond all possible causalities (which are mere phenomena) as the true characteristic of thinking. We must, therefore, say that, in the contemplation of a principle, the characteristics of contemplation and thinking intimately penetrate each other.
2. Thinking.—This has also been described before as an externalizing, and manifests itself here as asserting: “I. am; I exist independently—independently even of my knowing myself—now and forever. It is true that I also contemplate myself; but I do not get existence through this contemplation, nor shall I cease to have existence if this contemplation withdraws its breath, for I have an independent and on-itself reposing existence.” Hence there is here a going beyond all possible contemplation, and this going beyond constitutes the real character of thinking. Just as in external perception consciousness did not say, as it ought to have said on the basis of contemplation alone: “I behold such and such,” but said, “Such and such a thing is”; so in the present reflection consciousness does not say, “I behold such and such a principle,” but, rather, “Such and such a principle is.” Now these two or three—as you choose—components of reflection unite here together, just as in external perception, to an organic unity and inseparability. Hence the first named component takes also part in the effect of thinking, and there enters thus into the complete and actual consciousness not only a mere knowledge of knowledge, but moreover an independent being of such a knowledge; hence a knowing mind as the independent bearer of knowledge in all knowledge—at least, in all knowledge of external objects. It is quite evident that this knowing mind is the same in all knowledge which it originates through freedom. Again: since the principle and the knowing mind get their being through the same one thinking, it is quite evident that this being is also the same; and thus the thought of the Ego is made complete.
Let us ask here, even as above: what sort of thinking is that thinking we have just described? The thinking of the external object was an absolutely unconditioned thinking, a thinking which has existence just as soon as consciousness has existence. But the present thinking is a thinking conditioned by free reflection; hence a second thinking, and probably the second in order.
Furthermore: we observed, in regard to the first thinking, that it would not be proper at all to say: I think this thinking and by means of it the object; but rather: the universal and independent thinking itself thinks the object. So likewise here. The thinking which occurs here first thinks the Ego and gives it its being. For surely the Ego cannot well think before it is, and generate its generator! Hence the Ego is, precisely like the external object, the product of universal thinking, and is given to itself through this thinking just as the external object is given through it.
Hence also I cannot say properly: It is I, the free Ego, who represent this object—for whatsoever in my representation I intermix with my freedom is not objective;—but rather: I am free simply to direct my attention to this object, or to abstract from it.
This is highly important.