10
Holding Geny in a military prison cell in Manila was one way that Marcos kept Lopez at bay. Yet even after Geny
escaped to the United States in 1977 (as will be described later), Marcos still feared the Lopez clout and reach.
Settling in San Francisco, Geny told the New York Timesin March 1986, before he returned to Manila after
Marcos had fled the country, that he operated a small business importing and distributing Filipino foods. He said
that his family had spent the last sixteen years selling off bits of real estate. But “every time we tried to
embark on some business venture, Mr. Marcos assured that it didn't get off the ground.”11
The Washington Postreported that since 1973, four Filipino agencies had been operating in the United
States monitoring anti–martial law groups. Among these were the National Intelligence Security Authority, the
National Bureau of Investigation, and the Presidential Security Commission. Marcos had identified the agencies
during questioning in Honolulu, where he had fled on February 25, 1986, after being deposed. His testimony was
given in connection with a civil suit over the murders of two Filipino labor union activists in Seattle,
Washington, who had been known to criticize his regime.12
When the extradition threat, the assassination report, the monitoring by agents, and the harassment became widely
known, Filipinos were afraid to engage in political activism against the regime. In May 1975, when the MFP
publicized the findings of an Amnesty International report accusing the regime of holding 4,553 political
prisoners, it was presenting reputable proof that repression was common. But at the same time, the publicity was
frightening recruits from their cause. One indication of the spreading fear was the number of Filipinos seeking
political asylum. Beginning in July 1980, the Statistical Analysis Branch of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) in Washington, D.C., began classifying asylum applicants by nationality. By September 1983,
twenty-one Filipinos had been granted asylum; fifty-nine more had received asylum by June 1985, for a total of
eighty cases during a four-and-a-half year period. By ruling in favor of these asylees, the U.S. government was
clearly rejecting the regime's assertion that political activists were welcome to return home without fear of
imprisonment. Altogether, the INS received 502 asylum applications between July 1980 and April 1984.
One cannot discount the effect of good news circulated by the regime. Multipage glossy advertising inserts in
American business magazines such as Fortuneboasted of an improved climate for business investments and
for tourism.13The reference to civilian peace
was particularly pointed. Various accounts described the Philippines before martial law as a chaotic mess, with
rampant violence, crime, and corruption, and with runaway inflation. A month before martial law was imposed, more
than a dozen explosions occurred at offices, shopping malls, and government buildings. There was a desperate
sense that something drastic had to be done. Hence the early period of calm and civic order imposed by martial
law was generally welcomed.
There were some prominent endorsers of the order. Notable among those who considered it justified was General
Carlos Romulo, probably the most recognizable Filipino figure among Americans because of his association with
General Douglas MacArthur's defeat of Japan during the Pacific War. He waded ashore at Leyte with MacArthur
on October 1944 as the general began his campaign to drive out the occupying Japanese forces from the
Philippines. For Romulo, the pre–martial law Philippines had become “a wild west country.” He considered the
surrender of hundreds of thousands of guns the regime's “best achievement,” and a necessity for instilling
national discipline.14In a speech he
delivered in San Francisco before the Commonwealth Club of California on May 24, 1973, seven months after martial
law had been declared, he presented his case for the validity of its imposition. Not only did the Philippine
constitution give the country's chief executive this emergency power, just as President Lincoln had assumed
similar powers to save the Union, but it was a necessary move. Democracy, as practiced in accordance with the
Philippine model, was “mired in the other darker depths of democracy—the bickering, the factionalism, the
corruption, the aimless drift, and more than these, the rebellion of the alienated—the activities of those who
would use the façade of democracy to subvert its real meaning and purpose, for their own ends.” In essence, he
argued, Philippine-style democracy no longer worked. Marcos's “rescue operation” had saved the country from
becoming “in effect, a banana republic.”15
To rebut Romulo's praise of martial law, Manglapus sought an appearance on the widely watched American public
affairs program Meet the Press.“We have sponsors,” he was told. “If you are as well known as Romulo to
our sponsors, I might put you on.” However, “that was not the case,” Manglapus remembered. “So the very fact that
Romulo was for Marcos was another one of those things that we had to overcome during our early organizing
years.”16
According to the political scientist David Pacis, it took some time for the disappointment with and resentment of
the regime to broaden. He wrote that “generally, throughout the major phases of martial law, Filipinos and
international observers accepted Marcos's social contract: clean streets, less crime, and greater purchasing
power, among other things, for limited freedoms and fixed elections.”17On September 1, 1973, the regime launched “Operation Homecoming,” inviting
all overseas Filipinos, especially those residing in the United States, to visit home between then and February
28, 1974, to see for themselves “the marvelous transformation we have accomplished in the New
Society.”18The returnees were offered reduced
airfares, extended visas, tax breaks, and priority immigration and customs service upon arrival at the
airport.19When Manglapus was asked in an
interview with Americamagazine, a Jesuit publication, whether this indicated an openness and confidence
on Marcos's part, he replied to the contrary. To his mind, “it indicated a sense of insecurity. Similar
homecoming campaigns were subsidized by Hitler and Mussolini for German and Italian Americans in the 1930s as a
reaction to hostile feelings among Americans toward their dictatorial methods…. Returning Filipinos will see
cleaner streets and a surface calm. They will hear nothing of crime or corruption because the media are
programmed not to report such matters.”20